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"What we require now is a defense policy that adapts to the 
significant changes we are witnessing - without neglecting the 
enduring realities that will continue to shape our security strategy. A 
policy of peacetime engagement every bit as constant and committed 
to the defense of our interests in today ' s world as in the time of conflict 
and cold war."1 
INTRODUCTION 
These remarks of President George Bush extracted from his address at the 
Aspen Institute on 2 August 1990, contain the immediate seeds from which the US 
post-Cold War strategy of peacetime engagement has sprung. The enduring 
realities to which the president referred correspond "to three directions" toward 
which the revised US defense strategy is headed. These directions are "contending 
with the continuing Soviet reality, adopting a regional orientation, and emphasizing 
flexibility."2 
Peacetime engagement represents the first fundamental change in US 
defense strategy since the 1960s. Above all, the strategy depicts a new way of 
thinking about defense, a new comprehensive and multifaceted defense philosophy. 
Through peacetime engagement, the United States embarks upon a paradigm 
change in strategic perspective.3 Accordingly, after establishing the nature of the 
break with traditional US policy, this essay will address significant factors sur-
rounding each of the three key components associated with peacetime engagement. 
The key components are forward presence, nation assistance and continuum of 
military operations.4 The essay will conclude with an assessment of the problems 
and prospects of this three-pronged and evolving strategy. 
Peacetime engagement may be defined as "the strategic concept that coor-
dinates the application of political, economic, informational, and military means to 
promote regional stability, to retain US influence and access abroad and to defuse 
crises."5 This strategic concept marks a distinctive break with the US national 
security policy of containment. Peacetime engagement is the fundamental US 
policy of the post-Cold War era. In terms of national security strategy, the concept 
envisions a move from containment era flexible response to "discriminate re-
sponse," which entails both traditional "deterrence" and "influence." National 
military strategy, in turn, changes from a concentration on forward defense and 
rapid deployment to a focus on regional contingencies characterized by "forward 
presence and crisis response." 
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Outcomes endorsed under the new regime center on a phasing out of bipolar 
confrontation enroute to molding a "world community consensus" in favor of an 
"orderly transition" to a new world order.6 The US is entering what General Colin 
Powell, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, labeled a "fourth rendezvous 
with destiny." If America rises to the challenge, writes General Powell in the journal 
Foreign Affairs, "We can have peace - [and w]e can strive for justice in the world."7 
The article will now analyze each of the three key components associated 
with peacetime engagement: forward presence, nation assistance and continuum of 
military operations. 
FORWARD PRESENCE 
This component relates to the breadth or reach of peacetime engagement. 
The idea is to keep America engaged on the world scene in the aftermath of the Cold 
War in order to prevent a lapse into isolationism as in the past. A supplementary 
motive lies in pulling the US's former Cold War adversaries, especially Russia and 
China, into a type of common alliance centered on managing world peace and 
change in the new era. In this endeavor, the United Nations plays a pivotal role. 
President Bush made explicit his plans for great power collusion in his 
famous speech entitled, 'Toward a New World Order" delivered on 11 September 
1990. Bush stated, "no longer can a dictator count on East-West confrontation to 
stymie concerted UN action against aggression. A new partnership of nations has 
begun." In reference to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Bush added: "This is the first 
assault on the new world we see, the first test of our mettle... how we manage this 
crisis today could shape the future for generations to come." The former president 
then made explicit the utility of the UN in his plans: "We are now in sight of a United 
Nations that performs as envisioned by its founders ... The Security Council has 
taken the decisive step of authorizing the use of all means necessary to ensure 
compliance with [UN] sanctions."8 
On 10 October 1990, Bush addressed the United Nations General Assembly. 
Among his statements on that occasion were the following: "This is a new and 
different world. Not since 1945 have we seen the real possibility of using the United 
Nations as it was designed - as a center for international collective security." He 
added that we could now "build a new world based on an end to the Cold War."9 
Endorsing the momentum generated under Bush, as a presidential candidate 
Bill Clinton declared, "[It] is a failure of vision not to recognize that collective action 
can accomplish more than it could just a few years ago... The role of the [UN] during 
the Gulf War was a vivid illustration of what is possible in the new era."10 
As president, Bill Clinton has opted for what is generally acknowledged as 
a Wilsonian foreign policy. Echoing his earlier role model, Woodrow Wilson, who 
sought to "make the world safe for democracy," Clinton has embraced a policy of 
"engagement for democracy."1 ' Clinton is seeking to be the architect of about what 
Wilson could only dream and for what Bush had laid the foundation, a new world 
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order. Clinton is maneuvering US security policy ever closer in line with the 
pragmatic machinations of the UN Security Council, even as he draws down the 
resources allotted to the US military. 
Part of Clinton's decisional calculus lies in the priority of the US economic 
crisis. Faced with well-known budget shortfalls, the president hopes to have it both 
ways: to solve the domestic money problem while simultaneously extending the 
reach of US military and diplomatic influence in the world. The label "collective 
internationalism" has been attached to his efforts to have the US share the benefits 
of the collective power concentrated in the security council.12 
On the verge of strengthening collective internationalism, the Clinton 
administration has endorsed the call of the UN Secretary General for a "Standby UN 
Army." In the winter of 1992-93 issue of the journal Foreign Affairs, UN Secretary 
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali published the article, "Empowering the United 
Nations," which calls for such a force. Boutros-Ghali envisions a strengthened 
secretary general directing the force under the general guidance of the secretary 
council.13 
On 3 May 1993, the US Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, stated 
before Congress that, "a standby force is the way to go" to give the UN an enhanced 
military capability. She added that the UN peacekeeping mission needed an 
operations center, an intelligence capability and a more rigorous approach to 
budgeting: these in addition to national forces earmarked for UN use.14 
Since the Ambassador's remarks, however, the highly publicized scenes of 
mobs dragging dead American personnel through the streets of Somalia has muted, 
at least temporarily, American calls for a standby UN force. Furthermore, reacting 
to increasing criticism over administration foreign policy, on CNN's "Global 
Forum" of 3 May 1994, Clinton discussed his Haitian policy in terms reminiscent 
of old fashioned US unilateral interventionism in Latin America. Upon deciding to 
make intervention a viable option, the US would then seek to muster multilateral 
legitimacy for its unilateral decision. 
While the Clinton administration continues to address the first component of 
peacetime engagement by enhancing US ability to maintain a forward military 
presence in the world, it is also bent upon the process of nation assistance, the second 
component of the strategy. 
NATION ASSISTANCE 
The sudden eclipse of the relative equilibrium of the Cold War has thrust 
upon the world psyche a thirst for ethnic, racial and religious self-determination. If 
left unrestrained, demands to fulfill these psychic needs could engulf the planet in 
multiple crises of unprecedented proportions. It is in an effort to bring some 
modicum of civility and equilibrium to this dynamic and sensitive process of radical 
change that a policy of nation assistance has been embraced as a component of 
peacetime engagement. 
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Forward military presence wedded to collective internationalism creates the 
conditions which facilitate the implementation of nation assistance. In terms of the 
larger concept of peacetime engagement, the objective is to harness peace through 
Third World development in a coordinated global and regional context. Due mainly 
to new thinking among US defense analysts, regional organizations like the 
Organization of American States are becoming revitalized to tie regional develop-
ment to the goals and resources of the United Nations and the larger international 
community.15 
Coordination and cooperation, then, are imperative to effective nation 
assistance. This extends to the country team concept. Operating under US and 
international guidelines, US ambassadors in Third World countries are expected to 
guide the multifaceted divisions of their embassies in a coordinated, synergistic, 
manner to ensure the smooth transition of the host country to an embrace of 
democratic pluralism and free trade economics. Success depends upon melding of 
the diplomatic, economic, informational and military segments of the country team. 
Not only is cooperation between the country team, itself, on the one hand, and 
cooperation between the team and the US and international spheres on the other 
imperative. Also of paramount importance is the coordination and cooperation of 
all these with the host country and its various divisions. All of these levels must 
communicate and act as a unit for maximum success; success is defined as molding 
a fit between the goals and policies of a respective nation state with those of the 
larger new world order. 
A nation state whose policies are out of alignment with the larger goals of the 
emerging world system can disrupt the delicate equilibrium of the whole. For 
instance, with the world locked ever more tightly into a free trade mode monetary 
equilibrium depends upon a vision complementary to the Group of Seven (G-7) 
economic powers whose deliberations basically govern exchange rates. Further-
more, a viable system of free trade depends upon democratic pluralism in nation 
states as a hedge against economic protectionism. 
It is within this context that political and economic underdevelopment 
becomes a world security issue. Hence the US policy of peacetime engagement 
attaches maximum importance to the component of nation assistance. Nation 
assistance, in turn, is divided into "reactive" and "proactive" components. The 
former describes emergency responses to crises of either the natural or man-made 
variety. The latter or proactive component refers to the promotion of conditions for 
peace that require long-term involvement. 
The proactive element consists of designs to achieve security through 
"stability" and "sustainability." Stability is no longer defined in terms of maintain-
ing a status quo equilibrium as under the old bipolar balance of power configuration. 
Rather stability under the new world order paradigm means establishing the 
conditions for orderly change or transition. In a like manner, sustainability refers 
to development or transition into the new world order in an environmentally and 
resource-sustainable manner.16 
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The root causes of instability include such problems as poverty, illiteracy, 
and ethnic and social unrest. Augmenting these conditions are governments with 
institutions incapable or unwilling to come to grips with them. US students of 
developmental theory since the 1950s have considered the development of demo-
cratic and free trade regimes as depending fundamentally upon the cultivation of 
upwardly mobile, risk-taking political and economic entrepreneurs as progenitors 
of change.17 The primary difference between the fifties and the current era lies in 
the different world systems within which the respective change agents have been 
cultivated: in the fifties the ideal was the entrepreneur with an allegiance to the "free 
world," while currently loyalty to the norms of the new world order is the priority. 
The role of the US military in the developing Third World agents of change 
is critical and not without precedent. In the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, the military surveyed the West, developed the frontier and inland water 
navigation and even built the Panama Canal.18 Under the Kennedy administration 
the military played a strong developmental role through a policy of military civic 
action featuring medical, sanitation, engineering and social and economic devel-
opment technics." 
The Bush and Clinton administrations have drawn on these traditions to 
place a high priority on what Clintonites call "democracy building." For example, 
a new undersecretary position at the state department is charged with coordinating 
developmental policy with the assistant secretary for democracy and human rights, 
a newly created position in the Pentagon. Some 13 percent of the Clinton 
administration's fiscal 1994 budget for international affairs, amounting to $2.7 
billion, was earmarked for developmental initiatives. 
The Washington Post reported that one of these initiatives involved a re-
democratization of Haiti.20 Appearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
on 18May 1993, Secretary ofState Warren Christopher confirmed that the US was 
doing its part to assemble a rather substantial multilateral foreign aid package for 
the Haiti project.21 
Nation assistance and forward presence-collective internationalism are two 
of the three key components of the US policy of peacetime engagement. As these 
two work in tandem with each other, so together they blend with the third 
component, continuum of military operations. 
CONTINUUM OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 
According to the study, "Shaping an Army for Peace, Crisis and War," the 
continuum of military operations recognizes three strategic environments.22 The 
first of these, called the environment of peace, focuses explicitly on peacetime 
engagement. Counter-narcotics, anti-terrorism and peacekeeping supplement the 
parent function of nation assistance in the environment of peace. This environment 
features a policy of positive "influence" on the target countries. 
The second strategic environment in the continuum of military operations is 
called "hostilities short of war." "Suasion" is the policy of choice in this environ-
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ment. Types of operations typical of hostilities short of war include raids, 
peacemaking, noncombatant evacuation operations and counter-terrorism. Two 
distinct levels of suasion exist to control critical situations. One of these is the 
attempt to deter an adversary through a show of force; the mere presence of US 
military personnel may sometimes stymie a would-be aggressor. The second policy 
option under the rubric of suasion is the use of force to compel compliance, as in the 
US raid on Libya in 1986. Finally, the third strategic environment within the 
continuum of military operations is war, either limited or total. In this environment 
use of force is referred to as coercion. 
The ultimate objective of actions radiating from all three strategic environ-
ments is peace. The environment of peace, hostilities short of war and war all look 
forward to final consummation of a peacetime situation through "post conflict 
activity." Meanwhile, even in a condition of war, the theater commander is 
expected to continue monitoring activities in all diree strategic environments. 
Peacetime engagement and hostilities short of war are not to be discontinued just 
because war breaks out.23 
An example of how the levels of the continuum of military operations 
support and reinforce one another is seen in the Saudi Arabian connection to Desert 
Shield/Desert Storm. Several decades of US peacetime activities in Saudi Arabia 
paved the way for success in the military conflict which followed in 1990 and 1991. 
For example, activities endemic to what is now called peacetime engagement 
accounted in large part for the well developed infrastructure which greeted US and 
coalition troops in 1990. The ports, air bases and military cantonments were 
present, to a large extent, because of US peacetime policies. 
President Bush acknowledged the fruits of previous US peacetime success 
in his 1991 speech on national security strategy. The president quoted Saudi King 
Faud as follows: 
I trust the United States of America. I know that when you say you 
will be committed, you are, in fact, committed. I know that you will 
stay as long as necessary to do what has to be done, and I know you 
will leave when you are asked to leave at the end, and that you have 
no ulterior motives.24 
Success in the Gulf Crisis placed unprecedented demands upon US 
commanders. Even as they coordinated all three environments of the con-
tinuum of military operations in the theater of war, they were obliged to play 
the politics of world coalition building pursuant to the larger thrust of peace-
time engagement policy. 
What then is peacetime engagement? It may be described in both a broad and 
a narrow sense. In the broader and formal sense, it is the US national security policy 
associated with its three key components of forward presence, nation assistance and 
the continuum of military operations. Interpreted more narrowly and realistically, 
peacetime engagement is fully associated with only two key components, those of 
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forward presence and nation assistance, while in the third key component, con-
tinuum of military operations, it refers to only one of three strategic environments. 
The development of theory linking the broad and narrow perceptions of US 
peacetime engagement presents analytical problems which remain to be unraveled. 
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 
A prerequisite to viable theory building is consensus over terms and 
definitions. Efforts to reach such a consensus led in July 1991 to a "Peacetime 
Engagement Conference" in Washington, DC. Under the sponsorship of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict, the 
meeting drew representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, branches of 
the armed services, the Joint Staff and others. 
The meeting managed agreement of certain aspects of peacetime engage-
ment. Foremost is the view that it is a national security policy, not a war-fighting 
strategy. However, the conferees concluded, it "encompasses all US security 
policy in an environment short of war and therefore is broader than low-
intensity conflict."25 
This means peacetime engagement arguably should constitute more than just 
the first of three strategic environments in the continuum of military operations. 
Rather, "being broader than low-intensity conflict" it should also encompass the 
second strategic environment, hostilities short of war. If it could then take the next 
step and come to envelop war, the third strategic environment, then environment of 
peace or peacetime engagement would encompass all three environments in the 
continuum of military operations. Added to its envelopment of the other two key 
components, forward presence and nation assistance, this would make peacetime 
engagement a truly comprehensive policy. 
Therefore, the task for theory is to build a case for the linkage of peacetime 
engagement to the third strategic environment, war, in the continuum of military 
operations. As a first step in developing such a theory, we should come to grips with 
the wider connotations surrounding the word "linkage." 
A synonym for linkage in the literature of security policy is the term 
synergy, which refers to the properties of a whole system created through the 
interaction of its parts. In synergistic or systems analysis, the whole is considered 
to be the greater than the sum of its individual parts. A related descriptive term 
is differentiated integration, referring to the process of integration of otherwise 
disparate parts into an integrated whole. This is unity in diversity where diverse 
parts find unity in the process of pursuing the common objective of wholeness. 
From a synergistic perspective, peace is described in terms of wholeness; peace 
is a process of integration. 
Utilizing the process of creating wholeness as a common perspective, we can 
describe the formation of peace at various levels. On the level of the three-fold 
continuum of military operations, we can describe the process whereby the three 
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Strategie environments coalesce around the common objective of peace. This the 
literature already concedes: peacetime engagement, hostilities short of war and war 
already adhere officially to the common ultimate objective of promoting peace. The 
task for theory at this level is to link this process of peace formation synergistically 
to other levels of peace promotion through placing the process in a systems context. 
The synergistic promotion of peace at the three-fold level of the continuum 
of military operations could be linked to the level of theater war. The process by 
which commanders at the theater level integrate the various factors of war ulti-
mately into peace could then be synergistically described. Through linkage inherent 
in systems analysis, the analytical problem mentioned earlier of the separation of the 
national security policy of peacetime engagement from war fighting could be 
surmounted; war fighting could be incorporated into the same framework of 
analysis as the larger and more comprehensive policy of peacetime engagement. 
New thinking among security policy analysts has already begun to place war 
fighting in a synergistic context. For example, the winter 1992/93 issue of 
Parameters, the quarterly of the US Army War College, discloses that technological 
development is compressing the battlefield dimension of time while extending that 
of space. This is causing the three levels of war - strategic, operational, and tactical 
- to merge into a "single new structure for the integration of complex air-land-sea 
combat operations." Linked to this is a growing capacity "to immediately convert 
tactical success on the battlefield into decisive strategic results."26 
Synchronization and synergy are pivotal to success on the battlefield as the 
entire operation is predicated upon the integration of interrelationships so profound 
and fundamental that the whole becomes greater than the sum of its individual parts. 
The days when the execution of battle occurred in time-phased linear sequences 
with the levels of war fastidiously differentiated are yielding to a battlefield 
environment of fluidity and unpredictability. 
Synchronization and synergy are therefore of necessity coming to character-
ize methodology utilized in the study of war fighting. Two cases in point are recent 
monographs from the Army's Institute of Land Warfare. In one of these, Dr. Charles 
Kirkpatrick tells us that systems methodology focusing on relationship and integra-
tion, held the key to US Army preparedness for the Persian Gulf Crisis.27 
The other study of the Institute of Land Warfare, under the authorship of Dr. 
Richard Hooker, likewise describes a systems approach to war fighting in his 
analysis of the maneuver-based Air Land Battle doctrine followed in the Gulf War. 
Hooker says this doctrine stresses "fluid, nonlinear" movements on a "chaotic fast-
paced, messy battlefield characterized by friction in all its forms." Maneuver-based 
doctrine is best understood, he stresses, as a "thought process" featuring the intuitive 
response to events of highly motivated individuals.28 
What these studies stress as the important characteristics of theater battle are 
being incorporated into a framework for analysis of national strategy and political 
change at the macro or systemic level of the larger international system. For a fertile 
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effort toward building a theory integrating the variables for victory on a modern 
battlefield to die type of macro or systemic political change envisioned through 
peacetime engagement we turn again to an article in a recent issue of Parameters 
entitled "Chaos Theory and Strategic Thought."29 The study postulates the view that 
international system structure and stability lie buried within apparently random, 
nonlinear processes. These processes the study characterizes as "dynamical 
systems" with a large number of variables of shifting parts. Within these systems 
"nonperiodic order exists." 
As in the morphology of battlefield change, patterns of order ebb and flow 
in a larger chaotic system in rhythm with input mainly from individuals with highly 
developed intuitive skills. Chaos theory holds that international political and 
military structure is a product largely of "conflict energy" flowing from these self-
actualized individuals and the institutions in which they play dominant roles. The 
synergistic effect of these intuitively derived energies instigates conditions for 
change in international status quo. When this process "ripens" into a "critical state" 
systemic change is believed to ensue. 
This whole process chaos theory describes as "self organized criticality." 
The assumption is that change occurs as a result of interrelations and integration 
among forces intuitively generated from within the international system. Change 
is internally rather than externally generated, according to chaos theory.30 
The variables of chaos theory, then, are subject to analysis utilizing the 
synergistic approach of systems methodology. This has been shown to be the same 
methodology which could be used to describe and link the integration processes in 
the continuum of military operations. The integration of the three strategic 
environments and the integration of the variables of the battlefield share with each 
other and with the larger variables of chaos theory a common synergistic focus on 
peace formation as a process. Thus possibilities exist through systems analysis to 
develop a comprehensive theory of peacetime engagement linking the policy fully 
to its key component of continuum of military operations as well as to the other two 
key components of forward presence and nation assistance. 
Practical ramifications from a theoretically integrated strategic concept 
are readily apparent. El Salvador is a poignant example. According to a veteran 
of the US nation assistance program in that country, lack of systemic integration 
of local strategy with a coherent parent US strategic concept greatly compli-
cated the task of US advisors. This shortcoming reduced US supported 
government troops to gaining victory through basically a psychological endur-
ance contest with the guerrillas. 
Victor Rosello explained the problem as follows: "Had the Salvadoran Joint 
Command prepared a strategic plan that integrated strategic, operational, and 
tactical objectives, coordinated into multiple inter-zonal operations, the military 
might have defeated the FMLN on the battlefield." Rosello placed much of the 
blame for this oversight on the "US military advisory mission for not providing 
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more professional advice at the operational and strategic levels ... training and 
advice remained predominantly tactical."31 
Adoption of such a theoretically coherent and comprehensive policy of 
peacetime engagement as envisioned in this study assumes the surmounting of 
several analytical problems. Otherwise, a policy based on chaos theory and 
designed to formally integrate variables at the micro level of battlefield change 
with those of international systems change at the macro level would operate 
within a different paradigm than is apparent at present. This may be demonstrated 
in several ways. 
First, current policy assumptions contrast with chaos theory over the cause 
and nature of change. Chaos theory holds that system change and transformation 
result from basically intuitive causes generated internally, from within the 
system. On the other hand, pragmatic, not intuitive, change generated from the 
outside rather than from within the system is the current thrust of US peacetime 
engagement policy. 
A second analytical problem stems from the essentially status quo orienta-
tion of the current policy of peacetime engagement. The implied assumption that 
the present world power coalition of G-7 economic countries and the permanent 
members of the UN Security Council will maintain an indefinite equilibrium 
contrasts with die assumption of chaos theory of an international system in constant 
flux and characterised by unpredictability. 
A third problem calling for reconciliation centers on die current policy 
presumption that die nation state will continue indefinitely as me primary legal 
entity underpinning international affairs. A policy based upon chaos dieory could 
ordain no such constant as nation states forever governing the international system. 
It would allow, ramer, for die possible demise of nation state dominance in favor of 
smaller edinic-religious entities. 
Should strategists of peacetime engagement overcome diese analytical 
nuances to embrace a policy more "in sync" witii chaos tiieory, a world character-
ized by instability would still loom as a distinct possibility. This argument flows 
from me assumed key role under a chaos bound paradigm for individuals witii 
highly developed intuitive-based decision-making skills. Hitching the future of die 
world to die "inner voice" of self-actualized, intuitive, wise persons is a risky 
venture, given tiiat human evolution has as yet revealed no provable pattern toward 
goodness in an absolute sense. 
The antecedents of chaos dieory and to a large extent of die secular 
pragmatism of die Bush-Clinton variety are rooted in dieir modern form in die 
French Revolution. History records die painful results in post-revolution France of 
acting upon me premise diat de-emphasis on classical reason in favor of pragmatism 
and intuition would lead to a Utopian environment. Furthermore, transplanted to 
Germany via Napoleon, French Revolutionary dunking watered die seeds of a 
resurrected naturalistic mytiiology in mat country to plunge die world into two 
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major wars. That this same mindset has now come to characterize the US cultural 
milieu is the diesis, for example, of Allan Bloom's bestseller The Closing of the 
American MindP 
In the face of history, then, pause is in order before fully embracing the 
premises undergirding the emerging paradigm of peacetime engagement. With US 
policy still in a formative stage there exists the option of circumventing the echoes 
of the French Revolution to focus upon authentic American tradition flowing from 
the US Declaration of Independence. As heirs of that venerated document, 
Americans have historically assumed that all humankind is possessed of a latent 
common desire to rise above the situation based ethics of naturalism to embrace 
reason in the classic sense. Deducing truth from presumed transcendent absolutes 
is a distinctively American trait. 
A return to classical reasoning could help extirpate US strategy from its 
reactive mode. Short of such a paradigm shift back to rational or cognitive basics. 
the impending wedding of secular pragmatism to a chaos oriented intuitional 
framework stands to reinforce the inclinations of the Clinton administration to 
fashion security policy primarily along lines which domestic politics and the all 
encompassing media might dictate. A rededication to defining goals in terms of 
values reflecting universal absolutes would enhance US capability to anticipate and 
mold events in a predetermined strategic direction. Such a perspective could also 
be made accommodative to the growing need for initiative and flexibility at the 
tactical and operational level. 
In unprecedented and dangerous times, neither secular pragmatism nor an 
intuitive process teleology need go unchallenged as the philosophical moorings 
upon which is based the US strategic concept. With the United States currently the 
dominant, unipolar, power in the post-Cold War world, there is extant a window of 
opportunity to consider the promotion of a new world order on die common ground 
of classical reason. 
In an international environment suddenly characterized by awakening natu-
ral propensities toward ethnic and cultural cleansing, is it prudent to adopt a policy 
explicitly committed as in chaos theory to unleashing those very natural and 
intuitively derived propensities? 
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